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XIX
Concluding Observations: The Influence of
the Conflict in Iraq on International Law

Yoram Dinstein*

T

he conference from which these articles derive was an exceptionally successful and multilayered one in which a rich lode of legal insights and lessons
learned (based, in many instances, on firsthand experience in the field) was truly
struck. I cannot do justice to all the contributions to the conference and to this volume; I will simply focus on ten points that look particularly apposite to me.
A. “Lawfare” versus Warfare
The first point relates to the dichotomy between the laws of warfare and the war of
“lawfare.” The term “lawfare”—apparently coined, and certainly popularized, by
Major General Dunlap—is not just a clever play of words. We live at a time when
the shrewd use of law as a weapon in the marketplace of public relations may often
counterbalance the successful employment of weapons in the battlefield. In the debate, General Dunlap has suggested that it may be a good idea to educate the civilian population, which is potentially subject to aerial bombardment, to reconcile
itself to the inevitability of some collateral damage being engendered by almost any
attack. My own submission is that before you undertake the massive (and perhaps
impossible) task of teaching the enemy population to accept death as a fact of life, it
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The Influence of the Conflict in Iraq on International Law
may be more productive to educate the general public on our side of the aisle—and
especially the media and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—to face
up to the ineluctable consequences of war.
Speaking of the media, it cannot be ignored that they report armed conflicts
with little understanding of the legal niceties, and this has a serious impact on the
perceptions of the public at large. The very availability of precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) at this moment in history—a subject matter that I shall return to
infra C—has made commentators jump to the hasty conclusion that every attack
can be surgical, that every payload may acquire the target “on the nose” and that no
collateral damage should be viewed as immaculate anymore. As a matter of fact, in
April of this year, a major West Coast newspaper deemed fit to state that “[y]ou can
kill all the combatants you want. What you are not allowed to do is cause collateral
damage—civilian casualties.”1 Astonishingly, the authority cited for this implausible assertion is supposed to be no other than yours truly! I hope that I do not have
to persuade those present here that, in fact, I have always argued otherwise, i.e., that
there is no way to avert altogether collateral damage to civilians. But the real issue is
not the misleading authority: it is the misleading statement.
What is to be done about such misrepresentations of the law of armed conflict
(LOAC)? In my opinion, there are three practical steps that should be taken:

• In the daily briefings provided to the media during hostilities, it is
indispensable to incorporate some legal interpretation. In other words, it is not
enough to describe what happened, or even to include real-time visual (camera or
video) coverage of Air Force missions and similar highlights of the military
operations. It is absolutely necessary to offer the media a legal appraisal of the
events or, in other words, a bit of “lawfare” adjoined to reports of warfare. Surely,
the US Air Force—employing, as it does, some 1,300 lawyers—can allocate the
personnel required to fill what is currently a dangerous vacuum in the media
briefings.
• As pointed out by Professor Heintschel von Heinegg, the armed forces
cannot afford the interminable delays occurring prior to the publication of the
final conclusions of “in-house” armed forces fact-finding reviews of lethal
incidents in which something has gone wrong. The high command must
understand that, in the context of “lawfare,” such investigations must be
drastically condensed in time: they may even deserve priority over some military
operations. The critical exigencies of “lawfare” demand putting an end to the
present state of affairs in which charges of wrongdoing are immediately splashed all
over the front pages of the world press—without any authoritative response—
whereas results of the in-house inquiries, once released (frequently, many weeks
480
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later), are buried at the bottom of a back page. By then, irrespective of the outcome,
the public is convinced that the charges have been vindicated.

• New procedures must be found for fact-finding reviews of this nature. I do
not believe that human rights NGOs should take over the investigations. On the
other hand, when all is said and done, the incontrovertible reality is that the public
has become (rightly or wrongly) skeptical about the credibility of in-house
probes. The time has come to consider the possibility of leavening the fact-finding
process with the addition of some impartial observers to the board of inquiry.
B. The Nature of the Armed Conflict
Diverse views were voiced at the conference as regards the nature of the armed conflict in Iraq. As far as I am concerned, from a US standpoint this has been—and still
is—an international armed conflict. The United States (and its allies) went to war
against the Baathist Iraq of Saddam Hussein (as to the sequence of events in the
Gulf War, see infra J). This was an inter-State war when it started, and it remains an
inter-State war until it is finished. It is true that Saddam’s government has been
overthrown and a new Iraqi government has been installed in Baghdad. The US
(and allied) forces have been acting in full cooperation with that new government,
which has been recognized by the Security Council and by the international community at large. The United States–Iraq Agreement on the Withdrawal of United
States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, signed in 2008, only attests to that continued cooperation.
Yet, remnants of the Saddamist forces (minus Saddam himself)—strengthened by
jihadist foreigners—are still fighting in Iraq, and they have yet to be rooted out. As
long as US troops persist in waging combat operations against them, the hostilities
constitute an international armed conflict. The belligerent occupation of parts of
Iraq by US troops formally ended in 2004 (see infra G), but the war has gone on. I
was glad to glean from various presentations at the conference that, in practice, the
US military authorities in Iraq continue to apply the law of international armed
conflict. This is as it should be. The war in Iraq is not over until it is over.
This is the US outlook on Iraq. Evidently, the position is different insofar as internal Iraqi affairs are concerned. Side by side with the international armed conflict
still raging between the US (and allied) forces and the remaining Saddamists, Iraq
is plagued by a non-international armed conflict, in which the Baghdad government is equally trying to eliminate the last vestiges of the ancien régime. That is a
non-international armed conflict: since the fighting is protracted temporally and
widespread spatially, it is impossible to consider the ongoing violence as merely a
“below the threshold” internal disturbance.
481
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The Influence of the Conflict in Iraq on International Law
If I interpret correctly the presentation by Professor Turns, I think that he agrees
that we encounter in Iraq two parallel armed conflicts: one international and the
other non-international. There is nothing exceptional about the phenomenon of
the simultaneous prosecution of an international and a non-international armed
conflict within the borders of the same country.2 This possibility was expressly acknowledged by the International Court of Justice in its Nicaragua judgment of
1986.3 Iraq is just a paradigmatic recent example of two-pronged armed conflicts,
which are waged concurrently.
Legally speaking, the parallel armed conflicts must be analyzed discretely. In
many respects, the contemporary rules of LOAC in both international and noninternational armed conflicts have virtually blended.4 However, there is a crucial
divergence with respect to a number of pivotal subjects, primarily where postcapture treatment of personnel is concerned: the privileged status of prisoners of
war is strictly confined to international armed conflicts.5 The issue came to the
fore in the personal case of Saddam Hussein. When captured, the United States
treated him—rightly—as a prisoner of war. Of course, Saddam could have been
prosecuted by an American military tribunal for war crimes (i.e., grave breaches of
LOAC). But the United States chose not to proceed with the case. Instead,
Saddam was handed over to the Iraqi government, and—once subject to Iraqi jurisdiction—he no longer benefited from the advantages of prisoner of war status.
The end of the story is well known.
C. Precision-Guided Munitions
The wide availability and accuracy of precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—especially in air warfare (and particularly when employed in combination with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs))—was extolled by many participants in this
conference. There is no doubt about the radically increased capability to conduct
surgical attacks that minimize collateral damage. Yet, several caveats have been
corroborated by the proceedings.
The first point to bear in mind is that accuracy in delivering a weapon to a target
is contingent not only on the availability of PGMs but also—perhaps, preeminently—on a good reading of the target area and meticulous preplanning. The
trouble is that there are numerous instances in which air attacks (especially, albeit
not exclusively, when launched in close support of ground troops) are not linked to
any in-depth preplanning. Absent the element of advance preparation, the accuracy of a precision-guided munition cannot by itself be a sufficient guarantee of
avoiding mistaken identity of targets.
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In the final analysis, accuracy in attack is predicated on good intelligence (this is
where reconnaissance by UAVs may be a vital component in the equation). The
key to a successful attack may lie less in the availability of PGMs and more in the
collation and evaluation of reliable data. If an attack is launched on the basis of outdated or otherwise flawed information, the PGM may strike the target “on the
nose,” and nevertheless the results can be devastating to civilians. For a vivid illustration, suffice it to remind ourselves of the unfortunate episode of the Baghdad
bunker in 1991, in which hundreds of Iraqi civilians lost their lives by mistake since
they had sought shelter from air raids in the wrong place.6
It must be added that the post-event gauging of the legality of any attack must be
predicated not on hindsight but on foresight. In other words, what really counts is
not what we clearly see after the event, but what is glimpsed through the “fog of
war” by the commander in real time. Decisions on the battlefield are often warped
by an honest but mistaken belief in the existence of a constellation of facts which is
not borne out by reality. It is therefore useful to recall that Article 32(1) of the 1998
Rome Statute of the ICC (International Criminal Court) recognizes mistake of fact
as an admissible defense, thereby excluding criminal responsibility for war crimes.7
D. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is the key to the effective protection of civilians
and civilian objects from collateral damage in attack. The trouble is that, while everybody pays lip service to the principle in the abstract, its specific dimensions are
not always understood by the media, by NGOs or by the general public. Obviously,
proportionality is a relative term: it presupposes a comparison between A and B.
What are these A and B in the context of LOAC? It is frequently suggested by the media that the proper comparison to be drawn is between the number of human losses
sustained—and the amount of property destroyed—by both sides. Nothing is farther from the legal truth. The proportionality that really counts for the purposes of
weighing collateral damage is (A) the expectation of excessive incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, compared to (B) the anticipation of the concrete and direct military advantage to be
gained (see Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I of 1977).8
It is necessary to stress several points. The first is that proportionality has nothing to do with injury to combatants or damage to military objectives. LOAC does
not require any proportionality between combatants’ losses on the two warring
sides: the losses inflicted on enemy combatants and damage to military objectives
may be immeasurably greater than the counterpart casualties and destruction suffered at the enemy’s hand. Indeed, nothing precludes a belligerent party capable of
483
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The Influence of the Conflict in Iraq on International Law
doing so from pursuing a “zero casualties policy” where its own combatants are
concerned, while inflicting horrific losses on the enemy’s armed forces. Proportionality is strictly limited to collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects.
Even where collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects is concerned,
proportionality is by no means determined by purely crunching numbers of casualties and destruction on both sides. The quintessence of proportionality is that the
expectation of collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects must not be “excessive.” Some NGOs appear to confuse “excessive” with “any.” The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) commentary on Additional Protocol I
seems to mix up the term “excessive” with “extensive.”9 Both are misreadings of
the text.10 Even “extensive” civilian casualties may be acceptable, if they are not
“excessive” in light of the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The
bombardment of a vital military objective (like a naval shipyard or an industrial
plant producing military aircraft) where there are hundreds or even thousands of
civilian employees need not be aborted merely because of the palpable hazards to
those civilians.11
The whole assessment of what injury or damage is excessive in the circumstances entails a mental process of pondering dissimilar considerations lacking a
common denominator—namely, civilian losses and military advantage—and is
not an exact science.12 In the words of the Elements of Crime of the Rome Statute
of the ICC, this is a “value judgement.”13
From the text of Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I one can clearly deduce
that the appraisal of proportionality is not about results: it is about the initial expectation (of injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects) and anticipation (of
the military advantage). In other words, what counts is what is foreseeable before
the event.
The concrete and direct military advantage must be perceived in a contextual
fashion. According to Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, what counts is the
“overall” military advantage anticipated.14 By introducing the term “overall,” the
Statute clearly permits looking at the larger operational picture, as distinct from focusing on the particular point under attack. The attacker may argue, e.g., that an air
raid of no perceptible military advantage in itself is justified by misleading the enemy to shift its strategic gaze to the wrong sector of the front (the extensive air raids
in the Pas-de-Calais on the eve of the Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day in
World War II are an emblematic illustration).15
Preplanning, albeit of major significance, is not conclusive: the scene of a military encounter frequently changes rapidly. In training, it is required to underscore
the importance of situational awareness to the risks of excessive collateral damage.
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If an aviator or a platoon commander on the ground finds out that reality does not
match the pre-attack briefing, he has to abort the attack.
E. Direct Participation in Hostilities
Civilian protection from attack is vouchsafed, in conformity with Article 51(3) of
Additional Protocol I, “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”16 Direct participation in hostilities has proved to be a matter of critical importance in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the enemy flagrantly disregards the
cardinal principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. The need to define activities coming within the ambit of direct participation in hostilities is perhaps the “hottest” topic in LOAC today. It has become even hotter after the ICRC
published (in June 2009) an “Interpretive Guidance” on the subject,17 formulated
after thorough consultation with a fairly large group of experts but in disharmony
with the views of most of the Western members.
In the Newport conference of 2007 I addressed the specific (and complex) hypothetical scenario of a civilian driving a munitions truck to supply the armed
forces.18 There is a host of new settings of direct participation in hostilities coming
to light all the time. This year we heard about civilians who have to move around
Iraq for strictly civilian purposes, but—in order to get from one place to another—
have no choice other than joining a military convoy for their protection and en
route they are handed over weapons to be used against attack, thus becoming gunmen. No doubt, in case of an actual exchange of fire with the enemy, such civilians
will be viewed as directly participating in hostilities.
The most controversial issue in the context of direct participation in hostilities
is that of the “revolving door” syndrome, i.e., the case of persons who repetitively
take up arms against the enemy and then reassume the posture of innocent civilians. The ICRC maintains that civilian immunity from attack is restored each time
that the person ends his engagement in a hostile act and that no prediction as to his
future conduct is allowed.19 I and others profoundly disagree. In fact, the proposition is irreconcilable with the universal rejection of the concept of “a soldier by
night and peaceful citizen by day,” even by the ICRC commentary on the Additional Protocol.20
I do not want to go at length into the complex details of the “revolving door”
problem or other related issues, since I have a proposal to the organizers of the
Newport conferences. My proposal is to devote next year’s session to a systematic
examination of the whole topic of direct participation in hostilities.

485

Vol 86.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 86\_Ventura\Vol 86.vp
Monday, May 24, 2010 11:47:19 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen
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F. Private Military Contractors
This is a subject that has gained priority on the international legal agenda because
of Iraq and the large numbers of private military contractors (PMCs) involved
there (according to some estimates, the number of PMCs in Iraq equals that of the
US troops deployed). Intensive consultations by inter-governmental experts produced in 2008 The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations
and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflicts.21 According to this document, PMCs retain their civilian standing as long as they are not incorporated into the armed forces and do
not directly participate in hostilities.22
PMCs include engineers, technicians, instructors, construction workers, providers of food services and weapon specialists (tasked with training, maintenance
and repairs).23 However, if PMCs are hired by the military to actually operate
weapons systems or otherwise take part in the hostilities, they lose their civilian
protection.24 Even PMCs who retain their civilian status run a tangible risk of being
the victims of collateral damage (for instance, should the enemy attack a military
base in which they are employed).25 PMCs are particularly vulnerable to attack if
they put on military uniforms while in service.
G. Belligerent Occupation
Many of the presentations at the conference (for instance, those by Brigadier General Tate and Colonel Pregent) were linked to the dilemmas of occupation in Iraq,
whether under the guise of a belligerent occupation regime or in the context of a
post-occupation regime. The underlying questions are when belligerent occupation begins, what occupation is all about while it lasts and when it ends.
As far as the beginning of belligerent occupation is concerned, Professor
Benvenisti rightly pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between the invasion and occupation stages. But in my opinion it is advisable to note the possibility
of a hiatus between the two stages.26 This came to light in Iraq at the time of the
looting of the National Museum in Baghdad in April 2003. The Iraqi troops in the
area had already been defeated and driven away. The US combat troops advanced
through the area in pursuit of the enemy, but—being on a combat mission—had
to proceed to other destinations. The rear echelons had not yet established effective
control in Baghdad; the result was chaos enabling the Iraqi looters to act freely.27
What is the lesson learned? General Rogers has suggested that MPs should in the
future be assigned to accompany combat troops.28 But is this practical? One thing
is regrettably clear: you cannot prepare for everything.
486
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The legal foundation of the law of belligerent occupation can be traced back to
Hague Regulation 43 of 1907, which reads (in its common non-binding English
translation):
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country.29

The international law of belligerent occupation thus makes it plain that it is incumbent on the occupying power(s) to ensure, as far as possible, security to the population. Indeed, I submit that—if in real estate the three predominant considerations
are location, location, location—in belligerent occupation the three preponderant
considerations are security, security, security.
I found it almost amusing to hear in this conference that the US occupation authorities were deeply concerned about the revision of the Iraqi copyright law. I can
well understand that the existence of an outdated copyright law may become an issue after a prolonged belligerent occupation. After all, the local law cannot be
frozen for many years (let alone decades), and over a stretch of time the reasons for
law reform become compelling. Yet, when the belligerent occupation lasts in theory from April 2003 through June 2004, how did copyright even come into the
minds of the authorities of the occupying power(s)? They should have worried
about security, security, security, and then perhaps Iraq would have been a better
place to live in today.
As for the end of belligerent occupation, I bow to the binding decision of the Security Council in Resolution 1546 (2004), which—acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the UN—established that the occupation of Iraq was terminated by the
end of June 2004.30 I do so because I strongly believe that, by virtue of the combined effect of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter,31 the Security Council is vested
with the power to override all norms of international law (with the possible exception of peremptory norms constituting jus cogens),32 including those of LOAC. De
jure, the end of belligerent occupation in Iraq in June 2004—as decreed by the Security Council—was therefore unassailable. De facto, however, the end of belligerent
occupation of Iraq in 2004 was more notional than real.33 In realistic terms, the belligerent occupation should have been looked upon as continuing in some parts of
Iraq to this day. Only now when US combat troops are finally evacuating the main
Iraqi urban areas is the belligerent occupation of certain parts of Iraq perhaps coming to a close. Like war, an occupation is not over until it is over.
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The Influence of the Conflict in Iraq on International Law
The de jure termination of the belligerent occupation in Iraq in June 2004, of
course, made it possible for the legislation adopted there to become
“transformative”34 without being in breach of international law. But de facto, one
may well ask if the effective control of substantial parts of Iraq by US (and allied)
troops has been really affected by the Security Council resolution defining the end
of belligerent occupation. Who actually has looked after the security and the welfare of the population? The Iraqi government in Baghdad? There is an anecdote
told in Iraq about an inhabitant of an area controlled by Romanian troops (no offense to the Romanians intended) coming to a local police station complaining
that a Swiss soldier has just stolen from him a precious Romanian-made watch.
The sergeant at the desk asked the Iraqi if he was drunk. “Surely,” said the sergeant,
“you mean that a Romanian soldier stole from you a precious Swiss-made watch.”
“You said that,” answered the Iraqi, “not I.” Well, just as it is pure fiction that there
are Swiss soldiers in Iraq, it is pure fiction that between 2004 and 2009 all Iraqis
have been under the effective control of the Baghdad government.
H. “Stability Operations”
Captain Stephens quoted a manual on stability operations, telling us that these
have become “a core Army mission.” Assuming that stability operations (or, as
they were called by some other participants in the conference, “nation-building”)
are not merely a euphemism for counterterrorism combat missions, I am worried.
Undertaking such a transformative mission transforms not only the occupied
country: it is bound to transform also the armed forces of the occupying power(s).
Soldiers are supposed to be soldiers, not policemen or experts in political, social
and economic affairs. The core mission of an army is to carry out combat missions,
in order to defeat the enemy and win the war. This is what officers and other personnel are—and ought to be—trained for.
Stability as such, in any event, is overrated. Saddam’s regime was stable. What is
sought is stability under a democratic government based on the rule of law. However, while assistance in the building of a new democratic and stable Iraq is a worthy cause, I think that it should be rendered by those qualified to do so. For every
task in life there are qualified professionals. When the need arises, we rely on a doctor, a lawyer or a plumber to do what is required. Even in American football there
are separate teams for “defense” and for “offense,” each requiring different skills.
By the same token, you cannot expect the same folks in the military to specialize
both in combat and in “nation-building.” It is far better for the Army to concentrate on what it does best—combat—and to recruit civilian professionals to do
what they do best.
488
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I do not deny that the civilian professionals that I am addressing have to discharge their duties under the overall supervision of the armed forces. Indeed, it is a
basic premise of belligerent occupation that the government of an occupied territory must be military, and any civil administration must function as a subdivision
of the military government.35 Yet, even a military government is entitled to—and
in appropriate cases should—employ civilian professionals with the proper credentials, in order to fulfill specific tasks that in my view do not constitute part of the
core mission of any army.
I. Human Rights Law
At the conference, we heard (principally, from Ms. Modirzadeh) about the issue of
the relationship between human rights law (HRL) and LOAC. Let me add, however, that it is often forgotten that most human rights are subject to derogation in
wartime. As a good illustration, take internment (a topic that we heard about from
Captain Bill). Under HRL, in principle, “a policy of preventive internment, that is
the arrest and detention of those who are considered dangerous without any intention of bringing them to trial” is inconsistent with the basic human rights instruments.36 Yet, the same European Court of Human Rights—which is the authority
for this proposition, underlying its very first judgment, in the Lawless case of
1961—also pronounced that the norm is subject to derogation in time of war or
other public emergency,37 as per Article 15 of the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).38 Derogation of most human
rights is also possible under Article 4 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).39
Unlike HRL, derogation from LOAC rights—although possible in some extreme instances40—is limited to specific persons or situations and no others. Certainly, wartime per se does not justify derogation from LOAC: after all, by its very
nature LOAC is designed for application in wartime. The upshot is that LOAC may
provide a better solution to a given problem than HRL. Thus, where internment
under belligerent occupation is concerned, we have Article 78 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949: this provision explicitly permits preventive internment for imperative reasons of security, but this is subject to a procedure including the right of
appeal as well as a “periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent
body” (to be set up by the occupying power).41
It ensues that in wartime, as far as internment goes, LOAC has a humanitarian
edge over HRL. It is true that in peacetime, HRL attains a higher level of humanitarianism—let’s even say one hundred—but, if derogated in wartime, the level of
protection can drop to zero. LOAC may not aspire as high as HRL, but it never
489
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drops so low: it delivers a constant fifty. I find the half loaf most reassuring in the
face of a possibility of getting no loaf at all.
Admittedly, some human rights are non-derogable: freedom from torture is
a leading example (see the aforementioned provisions of the ECHR and
ICCPR). Yet, most non-derogable human rights coincide with rights established directly by LOAC, independently of HRL. Thus, torture in international
armed conflicts is expressly forbidden by all four Geneva Conventions,42 as well
as Additional Protocol I.43 An ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia) Trial Chamber held in the Furundzija case, in 1998, that the
LOAC prohibition of torture constitutes a peremptory norm of customary international law (jus cogens).44
The International Court of Justice held, in the advisory opinion on Nuclear
Weapons, that—in the conduct of hostilities—the test of an (unlawful) arbitrary
deprivation of life is determined by the lex specialis of LOAC.45 The lex specialis
construct of LOAC has been reaffirmed by the Court in its 2004 advisory opinion
on the Wall.46 The full connotations of the lex specialis status of LOAC can best be
appreciated in the context of the fundamental right to life, addressed by the Court
in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. In allowing lethal attacks against enemy
combatants, LOAC runs counter to the basic tenets of human rights law concerning extrajudicial deprivation of life.47 Nevertheless, in the event of an international
armed conflict, the LOAC norms—as lex specialis—prevail over the lex generalis of
human rights.
This does not mean that relations between LOAC and HRL law are characterized by constant friction. In reality, there are only a few examples of collision between them.48 Still, there is no denying the incompatible approaches of LOAC and
HRL to some central issues, and it must be observed that the discrepancies are not
limited to the treatment of combatants. Thus, in the words of Theodor Meron:
“Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and
wounding of innocent human beings not directly participating in hostilities, such
as civilian victims of lawful collateral damage.”49
J. Jus ad Bellum
Lieutenant Commander Wall addressed the issue of jus ad bellum in Iraq. This, as
everybody knows, is a controversial topic. I have addressed the subject myself in a
previous Newport conference,50 and do not wish to repeat my arguments. Let me
just say, very succinctly, that—for my part—the key to unlocking the conundrum
of Iraq lies in understanding that (a) the Gulf War that started with the invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 is still going on, (b) the period between 1991 and 2003 was largely
490
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one of ceasefire (punctuated by sporadic hostilities between Iraq and the coalition
led by the United States), (c) Iraq (as authoritatively determined by the Security
Council51) was in material breach of its ceasefire obligations (especially insofar as
the destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was concerned), and (d)
the fighting of 2003 and thereafter should be viewed merely as the resumption of
general hostilities by the coalition in response to that material breach.52
The fact that no WMD were actually found in Iraq does not affect the legal analysis. Iraq had clearly amassed WMD at earlier times—in material breach of the
ceasefire—and all intelligence services worldwide were convinced that it continued
to do so. Even those who were opposed to the coalition’s military action in 2003 did
not deny that basic fact and merely wished to postpone the clash of arms (some
commentators now argue that Saddam himself deliberately misled the world to believe that he possessed WMD for some convoluted reasons that escape me). Well,
in wartime, smoke and mirrors can become all too real. In the sphere of the jus ad
bellum—no less than in that of the jus in bello—what ultimately counts is reasonable evaluations of the facts as they appear at the time of action, rather than postevent hindsight knowledge.
K. Conclusion
Although the worst appears to be over in Iraq, the “nation-building” there is still in
many respects a work in progress. The United States finds itself still on a learning
curve. Winston Churchill famously said that Americans always come to the right decision—after they have tried everything else. In Iraq it seems that everything else has
already been tried. Let us hope that Americans will arrive at a right decision soon.
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